In this paper we document evidence of systemic risk taking from syndicated loan markets. Using U.S. syndicated loan data, we find that the borrower's idiosyncratic risk is positively priced whereas systematic risk is negatively related to loan spreads, controlling for firm, loan and bank specific variables. We argue that the underpricing of systematic risk relative to idiosyncratic risk suggests banks' preference for investing in systematic risk which increases interbank correlation and systemic risk of banks. We relate the incentive for systemic risk taking to the 'Too-many-to-fail' guarantee and the associated collective moral hazard of 'love for correlation'. We further show that small and less correlated banks underprice systematic risk relative to big and more correlated banks.
Introduction
Regulators usually bail out distressed banks ex post in systemic crises when the number of failed banks is large. This 'Too-many-to-fail' guarantee may distort banks' incentives and induce banks to increase interbank correlation by expanding common exposure to aggregate shocks. This preference of 'love for correlation' may encourage banks to invest in systematic exposure of borrowers to maximize the likelihood of failing together. The positive value of systematic exposure entitled by the public guarantee may lead banks to underprice systematic risk relative to idiosyncratic risk, which can be interpreted as evidence of banks' systemic risk taking. In this paper we empirically test the impact of 'Too-many-to-fail' guarantee on the systemic risk taking of banks from loan pricing using a sample of U.S. syndicated loans over the period 1988 to 2011.
Using equity volatility as proxies for borrowers' idiosyncratic and systematic risks, we show that loan spreads are positively related to borrowers' idiosyncratic risk whereas negatively related to systematic risk, controlling for firm, loan and bank specific factors and year dummies. The underpricing of systematic risk is consistent with the risk taking story that banks love for correlation and expect to get regulatory subsidies in collective bank failures.
This pricing pattern is robust to a number of systematic risk measures. In addition, we show that our results are not driven by unobserved firm or bank factors. In particular, our results remain largely unchanged when including firm fixed effects and bank fixed effects.
We show that systematic risk is not underpriced relative to idiosyncratic risk in the cohort of loans originated by nonbank lenders in absence of 'Too-many-to-fail' guarantee. In fact, nonbank lenders charge high spreads for systemic risk relative to idiosyncratic risk, consistent with the standard asset pricing literature.
We show that less correlated banks have stronger incentives to increase interbank correlation by investing in borrowers systematic risk. In particular, less correlated banks underprice systematic risk relative to more correlated peers. Once we split our sample into loans granted by less correlated and more correlated banks, we find only less correlated banks underprice systematic risk. This is in line with the prediction that less systemic banks have stronger incentives to increase its correlation with peer banks. In addition, we show that less correlated banks take out larger loan share and larger loans from systematically risky borrowers. The finding of large exposures to systematic risk of less correlated banks supports the idea that less correlated banks are aggressive in risk taking. In the end, we show that small banks underprice systematic risk relative to large banks, consistent with the argument in Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) that small banks have stronger incentives to increase interbank correlation. This finding rules out the possibility that our results are driven by 'Too-big-to-fail' guarantee.
Our work is related to three strands of literature. First, there is a burgeoning literature on credit spreads and equity volatility in asset pricing. In a seminal paper Campbell and Taksler (2003) find evidence that equity volatility, especially idiosyncratic equity volatility, has substantial explanatory power for corporate bond yields. Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2009) and Ericsson, Jacob and Oviedo (2009) apply the same logic to credit default swap (CDS) pricing and find equity volatility is an important determinant of CDS spreads. Depart from the traditional pricing literature in which researchers rely on the characteristics of the issuer and asset as pricing factors, in the loan pricing context we can additionally control for the characteristics of the investors (banks) of the assets (loans) in this study. The rationale is that the characteristics of banks as the loan investor, such as capital, risk appetite and so forth, may have important impacts on the loan contract and pricing as suggested by the banking literature. Another paper that studies equity volatility and loan pricing is Gaul and Yusal (2013) . However, their focus is to use equity volatility to explain the 'Global Loan Pricing Puzzle' documented in Carey and Nini (2007) that syndicated loan spreads are generally lower in Europe than in U.S. In addition they do not dig into the pricing discrepancy in systematic and idiosyncratic volatility. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first attempt that uses equity volatility to analyze how borrowers systematic and idiosyncratic risks are priced in loan contracts and how such pricing strategy depends on bank characteristics.
Second, in the literature of determinants of bank loans pricing much attention has been paid to information asymmetry (Focarelli, Pozzolo and Casolaro, 2008; Winton and Santos, 2008; Ivashina, 2009; Saunders and Steffen, 2011) , location of syndicated loan markets (Carey and Nini, 2007) , bank-firm relationships (Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000) . The primary focus of these studies is to characterizing the factors that affect borrowers' risk and risk assessment of lenders. By contrast, our analysis starts from the risk per se and decomposes risks into systematic and idiosyncratic components. We investigate how the two components are priced differently which is of relevance to risk management. In addition, most research focus on borrowers' side and very few studies incorporate lenders characteristics into analysis. Santos and Winton (2009 ), Santos (2011 ) and Cai, Saunders and Steffen (2011 are exceptions. Santos and Winton (2009) analyze how bank capital, borrower cash flow and their interaction affect loan pricing. They show that less capitalized banks charge relatively more for borrowers with low cash flow but offer discounts for borrowers with high cash flow. Santos (2010) shows evidence of credit crunch in the subprime crisis that even though firms paid higher loan spreads and took out smaller loans during the subprime crisis, the increase in loan spreads was higher for firms that borrowed from banks that incurred large losses. Our study differs
from the two as we analyze how bank correlation instead of bank capital and losses affects loan pricing. Cai, Saunders and Steffen (2011) is the closest to our study as they find borrower is charged a lower interest rate if the syndicate consists of lenders that are closer in terms of lending specialization based on loan portfolios. Moreover, they find most interconnected lenders are the greatest contributors to systemic risk. However, the lower overall lending rates in their paper come from lenders' collaboration on screening and monitoring within the syndicate, different from the lower loan spreads on systematic risk relative to idiosyncratic risk due to the systemic risk taking in my study.
Last, the extensive literature on bank risk taking tries to link risk taking to bank corporate governance and regulation (Laeven and Levine, 2009) , banking competition and deposit insurance (Keeley, 1990) , government bailout policies (Gropp et al., 2011 ), CEO compensation (DeYoung et al., 2012 and monetary policy (Altunbas et al., 2010) . However, few papers examine risk pricing by banks. Ioannidou, Ongena and Peydro (2008) and Paligorova and Santos (2012) are two exceptions. Using Bolivian credit registry data, Ioannidou, Ongena and Peydro (2008) find that Bolivian banks underprice risk when monetary policy is ease. In particular, they show that a decrease in U.S. fed fund rate prior to the loan origination raises the probability of default and loan spreads charged by Bolivian banks decrease in changes in the probability of default of borrowers. Using U.S. syndicated loan data, Paligorova and Santos (2012) show that banks charge riskier firms lower lending rates in periods of expansionary monetary policy than in periods of tight monetary policy. Combining lending standard information from Senior Loan Officers Opinion Survey, they show that the interest rate discount for riskier borrowers in easy monetary policy is prevalent among banks with greater risk appetite. Unlike Paligorova and Santos (2012) , we analyze banks risk taking incentive from bank correlation and systemic risk rather than low interest rates that affect both borrowers and lenders.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical motivations and proposes our hypotheses. Section 3 presents our data, methodology and summary statistics. Section 4 reports empirical results. In the end, we conclude in section 5.
Theoretical Motivations and Empirical Hypotheses

Too-many-to-fail and Bank Systemic Risk-Taking
Regulatory actions of the resolution for bank failures such liquidation, acquisition or bailout depend on whether the problems arise from idiosyncratic reasons specific to particular financial institutions or from systematic reasons that may threat the whole financial system. Though the loss of an individual bank failure may be limited, the cost of closing down a substantial part of the banking system in a systemic crisis would be huge in terms of fire sales, contagion, investment discontinuation and disruption of lending relationship. In practice, regulator usually seeks for private sector resolution for individual institution failure, for example asking a healthy bank to acquire the failed one. By contrast, government interventions such as nationalization and bailout are often seen during systemic crises. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) model the 'too-many-to-fail' problem that a bank regulator finds it ex post optimal to bail out failed banks when the number of failures is large, whereas the probability of the collective bailout is low when the number of bank failures is small, as failed banks can be acquired by surviving banks. The ex post optimal bailout exists in the circumstance that the costs of injecting funds are smaller than the misallocation cost of liquidating bank assets to outside investors in case of systemic banking crisis. Therefore, the bailout expectation creates incentives for banks to herd ex ante in order to maximize the likelihood of failing together and therefore collective bailout. In particular, banks have incentives to increase interbank correlation which leads to the collective moral hazard of 'love for correlation'. In addition, Acharya and Yorulmazer show that small banks have stronger incentives to herd under the 'Too-many-to-fail' guarantee. The rationale is that the bailout subsidy increases for small banks when big banks have also failed while it does not increase for big banks when small banks have also failed. Brown and Dinc (2009) document evidence of the 'Too-many-to-fail' effect that a government is less likely to close a failing bank if other banks in that country are weak.
To increase the likelihood of failing together, banks may ex ante endogenously choose the default correlation of assets. Bank may increase interbank correlation by investing in the syndicated loan markets. On the one hand, lenders are interconnected and are exposed to the common set of borrower. This is the bank side linkage emphasized by Cai, Saunders and Steffen (2011) . On the other hand, banks can further increase correlation by lending to systematically risky firms which are likely to default together in aggregate shocks. In this paper we focus on this firm side linkage of bank correlation.
Bank systemic risk taking in presence of the 'Too-many-to-fail' guarantee by investing in the systematic risk of borrowers has pricing implications. When a lead arranger sets the lending rate, it takes into account both the idiosyncratic and systematic risks of the borrower.
On the one hand, the losses from the firm-specific default is expected to be borne by the lender, therefore idiosyncratic risk should be positively priced in syndicated loan contracts. On the other hand, the bank may be less worried about the systematic default as it is likely to get regulatory subsidies in a systemic crisis. In addition, the bank prefers to increase correlation by investing in systematic risk and is likely to offer lending rate discount. The 'love for correlation' effect may give rise to underpricing of systematic risk relative to idiosyncratic risk once the benefit of increased correlation dominates the cost of exposure to aggregate shocks..
Empirical Hypotheses
The 'Too-many-to-fail' guarantee encourages systemic risk taking of banks. In particular, banks have incentives to increase interbank correlation by investing systematic risk of borrowers. This collective moral hazard of 'love for correlation' may lead to underpricing of systematic risk. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Banks require lower loan spreads on the systematic risk of the borrower relative to the idiosyncratic risk in presence of the 'Too-many-to-fail' guarantee, indicating bank systemic risk taking.
An alternative hypothesis derived from the standard asset pricing literature assumes that idiosyncratic risk can be diversified away whereas systematic risk is non-diversifiable. Hence, in absence of systemic risk taking, risk averse lenders should charge higher lending rates on systematic risk relative to idiosyncratic risk. This leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Lenders require higher loan spreads on the systematic risk of the borrower relative to the idiosyncratic risk in absence of the 'Too-many-to-fail' guarantee.
Overall, the relative underpricing of systematic risk may be interpreted as evidence of systemic risk taking. To better understand the systemic risk taking in presence of the 'Toomany-to-fail' guarantee, we test the pricing pattern of loans originated by nonbank lenders which are not protected by such safety net. In principle, we expect Hypothesis 2 to hold for nonbank lenders.
In addition, the pricing of systematic risk may depend on bank correlation and size.
According to the 'Too-many-to-fail' story, less correlated and small banks have stronger incentives to invest in systematic risk than more correlated and big banks, as the marginal value of interbank correlation is higher for the former. Less correlated banks compete for systematically risky assets and the 'race to bottom' pushes down the lending rates. Therefore, less correlated banks are likely to underprice the systematic risk more.
Hypothesis 3: Less correlated and small banks have stronger incentives to take systematic risk and therefore underprice systematic risk.
However, the traditional 'Too-big-to-fail' theory has an opposite prediction that big banks may underprice systematic risk relative to small bank as big banks are likely to get regulatory subsidies and therefore shift risk.
Hypothesis 4: Big banks should underprice systematic risk due to risk-shifting in presence of the 'Too-big-to-fail' guarantee.
Taken together, we have two groups of competing hypotheses. In the first two hypotheses, 'Too-many-to-fail' theory and standard asset pricing theory predict opposite pricing patterns, depending on the presence of systemic risk taking. In the last two hypotheses, assuming systemic risk taking, 'Too-many-to-fail' theory and 'Too-big-to-fail' theory predict opposite pricing patterns, depending on bank correlation and size.
3 Data, Methodology and Summary Statistics
Data
Obtaining syndicated loan data from LPC Dealscan, we focus on U.S. firms borrowing from U.S. banks over the period between 1988 and 2011 1 . We exclude loans borrowed by companies in the financial sector from our sample (SIC codes 6000 to 6400, Finance and Insurance). Our analysis focuses on lead arrangers, which are delegated to collect information and monitor the borrower on behalf of the syndicate and set loan terms and pricing 2 . Syndicated loans are usually structured in a number of facilities, also called tranches. We treat facilities in each deal as different loans because spreads, identity of lenders and other contractual features often vary within a syndicated loan deal. This is a common practice in loan pricing literature (See similar analyses in Carey and Nini, 2007; Focarelli, Pozzolo and Casolaro, 2008; Santos, 2011) . Therefore, each observation in our regressions corresponds to a syndicated loan facility.
Our results are qualitatively unchanged when using loan characteristics of the largest tranche for loans of multiple tranches or analysis at the deal level.
By merging Dealscan with Compustat, we have detailed annual accounting information of borrowers 3 . Compustat consists of annual report data of publicly listed American companies, which are assumed to have less information problems than privately held firms.
To calculate equity volatility of borrowers, we collect daily stock return data over the year leading up to the facility activation date from CRSP for borrowers listed in NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ 4 . We drop out borrowers with less than 100 trading days available in the event window 5 . Moreover, we collect Fama-French Factors from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).
In the end, we focus on loans with single lead arranger so that we can clearly identify the 1 Before 1987, the coverage of Deanscan is uneven. 2 Dealscan indicates the role of each lender. We follow the classification rule in Cai, Saunders and Steffen (2011) . If the variable LeadArrangerCredit indicates "Yes", a lender is classified as a lead arranger. We correct for the role of lenders of loans that LeadArrangerCredit indicates "Yes" but "LenderRole" falls into participant as non-lead arranger. In addition, if no lead arranger is identified, we treat a lender as a lead arranger if its "LenderRole" is classified as following items: Admin agent, Agent, Arranger, Bookrunner, Coordinating arranger, Lead arranger, Lead bank, Lead manager, Mandated arranger, Mandated Lead arranger.
3 We are indebted to Sudheer Chava and Michael Roberts for providing the link between Dealscan with Compustat, see Chava and Roberts (2008) . 4 We link LPC Deanscan with Compustat via GVKEY. Next, we use PERMNO to link Compustat with CRSP.
5 Campbell and Taksler (2003) argue that a fairly long event window is required to measure the volatility that is publicly observed by corporate bond investors.
impact of lender characteristics on loan pricing 6 . We manually match lead banks in Dealscan with commercial banks in Call reports, depending on bank names, geographical locations and operating dates. We complement the unmatched sample with banking holding companies from Federal Reserve Y-9C reports. Additionally, we control for mergers and acquisition by matching the lender to the accounting information of the acquirer.
To calculate the market based interbank correlation, we collect banks' daily stock return data one year preceding to the quarter of loan origination from CRSP. The S&P 500 banking sector index comes from Datastream tracing back to the last quarter of 1989. We link bank stock return with Call Reports and FY Y9C using the CRSP-FRB link from Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In particular, we match commercial banks that are subsidiaries of listed bank holding companies with the stock information of their parent companies.
Methodology
In the baseline regression, we run cross-sectional OLS regressions that pool together all valid observations. Models are estimated with robust standard errors which are clustered at the borrower level to correct for correlation across observations of a given firm, though our results are insensitive to clustering at lender or borrower-lender pair levels.
where f , i, b and t denote facility, firm, bank and year, respectively. The dependent variable all-in-drawn spread in Dealscan is an interest spread over Libor measured in basis points.
IdioVol and SysVol represent idiosyncratic and systematic risks, respectively. We include firm specific variables (F irm i ), loan specific variables (Loan f ) and bank specific variables (Bank b ). We also include year dummies T throughout all specifications. is the error term.
Hypothesis 1 asserts that α 1 > α 2 as banks require lower compensation for bearing systematic risk for the sake of increasing correlation in presence of systemic risk taking.
Hypothesis 2 predicts the opposite as banks require higher compensation for non-diversifiable systematic risk.
To compute our key independent variables, systematic and idiosyncratic risks of borrowers, we rely on borrowers' equity volatility which is forward-looking and driven by market information. The idea is that we can think of the holder of risky debt as the owner of riskless bonds who have issued put options to the holder of firm equity (Merton, 1974) . The strike price equals the face value of the debt and reflects limited liability of equity holders in the event of default. Increased equity volatility raises the value of put option, benefiting the equity holder at the expense of the debt holder. Hence a firm with more volatile equity is more likely to reach the bound condition for default. We further decompose borrowers equity volatility into systematic and idiosyncratic components to proxy systematic and idiosyncratic risks, respectively. We run a standard CAPM regression as follows:
where r i , r m t and r f ree t are individual stock daily return, market return calculated as the valueweight return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks in CRSP and risk free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill rate, respectively. We define the idiosyncratic volatility as standard deviation of the residual, IdioV ol CAP M =SD( ). In addition, we define the systematic exposure as the product of beta and market volatility, SysV ol CAP M =β CAP M × M arketV ol, where M arketV ol is the standard deviation of market excess return, M arketV ol
Alternatively, we adopt Fama French (1993) three-factor model using the following regression:
Where the market factor M KT t is the value-weight return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NAS-DAQ stocks from CRSP minus the one-month Treasury bill rate, the size factor SM B t is the average return on the three small portfolios minus the average return on the three big portfolios, the value factor HM L t is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the average return on the two growth portfolios, respectively. We stick to the standard deviation of the residual IdioV ol F F = SD(ε) as idiosyncratic volatility. As for systematic risk, we follow Balin, Brown and Caglayan (2012) and define the systematic risk in the multifactor model as the total volatility that is attributable to Fama French factors and the factors' cross-covariances, SysV ol F F = T otalV ol 2 − IdioV ol F F 2 . In the end, we annualize all equity volatilities by a multiplier of √ 252.
To identify the impact of bank correlation on risk pricing, we first calculate the correlation of bank daily excess return with the S&P 500 banking sector index using the data one year prior to the quarter of loan origination. We construct a dummy variable LowCorrBK that equals one if the bank correlation is smaller than the median value and zero otherwise. We then interact the bank correlation with borrowers' equity volatilities. Overall, we run the following regression:
The key variable of interest is the interaction between systematic risk and bank correlation dummy SysV ol i,t−1 × LowCorrBK b,t−1 . Hypothesis 3 states that less correlated banks underprice systematic risk more than more correlated peers, equivalent to α 4 < 0. Put differently, less correlated banks charge lower lending rates on systematic risk than highly correlated banks. By contrast, Hypothesis 4 predicts α 4 > 0 according to the 'Too-big-to-fail' theory.
We include a number of firm level controls that may affect the lending interest rates.
Sales is the log of the firms sales at close in millions of dollars. Larger firms are more informationally transparent, therefore we expect larger borrowers have lower spreads. Next,
Leverage is a ratio of total debts to total assets. Highly leveraged firms are more likely to default, hence we expect they are charged a higher lending rate. In addition, we use Z score to control for the borrowers' likelihood of bankruptcy. As a higher Z score indicates lower credit risk, we expect firms with higher Z scores to obtain lower loan spreads. Besides, we control for Profit Margin, which measure the performance and profitability of the borrower. As a profitable firm is safe and less likely to fall into financial distress, it should be charged a low spread. As for the firm specific controls that affect loss given default (LGD), we include new working capital and tangibles assets. NWC measures a ratio of net working capital to total assets. We expect firms with more net working capital to lose less value in the event of default.
In addition, Tangibles measures a fraction of tangible assets to total assets. Borrowers with a higher fraction of tangible assets are more informationally transparent (Morgan, 2001 ) and have higher values in the event of default as the value of intangible assets are much volatile.
Therefore we expect a lower spread on the loans granted to borrowers with a higher fraction of tangible assets. We control for Market-to-Book ratio MKTBOOK, an imperfect proxy of Tobins q, which is a ratio of the market value of a firm to its accounting value. We expect a firm with a higher Market-to-Book ratio to have lower spreads 7 .
Even though loan specific variables are jointly determined with loan spreads and therefore are endogenous, we include these contractual features. We include Facility Size, measured by the log of the tranche amount in millions of dollars. Large loans are likely to be associated with greater credit risk in the underlying project and lower liquidity, but could also be related to larger borrowers which have more cushions against adverse shocks. Therefore, the impact of Facility Size on loan pricing is not unambiguous. Additionally, we include Maturity which is the maturity of the facility in months. The effect of maturity on loan spreads is also ambiguous. Next, we use Number of Lenders within a facility and Number of Facilities within a deal to proxy the syndicated structure. To proxy for the liquidity exposure of each facility, we classify a loan as a line of credit (Revolver ) or a term loan (Term Loan) 8 . Moreover, we include dummy variables that indicate whether a loan is senior (Senior ) in the borrowers' liability structure and whether the loan is secured by collateral (Secured ). Seniority and collateral may reduce the lenders' loss in the event of default and therefore reduce lending rate, however, the contractual arrangement may be ex ante required to protect lenders towards specifically risky borrowers. Therefore, the relation between seniority, collateral and loan pricing is an empirical question. To control for the impact of bank liquidity on loan rates, we include Liquidity BK to measure the liquidity of bank assets, which a ratio of liquid securities and cash to total assets. Besides, we include the growth rate of loans (Loan Growth BK ) to measure investment opportunities of the lender. In the end we use Cost of Funds BK which is total interest expenses over total liabilities to measure funding costs.
In particular, we use the accounting information of the borrower and lenders from the fiscal year ending in the calendar year t − 1 for loans made in calendar year t. To eliminate the bias from outliers, we winsorize loan spreads, firm and bank specific variables and borrowers' equity volatilities at 1 and 99 percentile levels 9 . We include year dummies to capture time trends throughout the analysis.
Summary Statistics
Our final sample consists of 469 U.S. banks granting 11 278 facilities to 4 183 U.S. firms. Table   1 presents summary statistics of our sample before winsorizing. The average loan spread is 9 See Table 8 to 10 for detailed information for variables.
208 basis points over Libor. The average CAPM Idiosyncratic Volatility is 0.56, very close to the mean of total volatility. Since market is usually relatively stable, the average Systematic Volatility which is the product of Beta and Market Volatility is rather small (0.12), much smaller than the average beta (0.76). It is worth noting that systematic volatility could be negative as the beta of some borrowers is negative. The idiosyncratic and systematic volatilities estimated from CAPM and Fama French three factor models are quite similar.
Looking at firm level controls, we find the average log of firm total assets is 5.6. It is worth noting that the log of facility size can be negative when the loan is pretty small. The mean of borrowers leverage is 28 percent. On average, the Z score of firms are 4 in our study. The profit margin is highly skewed, with a mean of -20.75 percent and a median of 3.19 percent.
The mean of net working capital to total assets and tangible assets to total assets are 21 and 69 percent, respectively. The average market to book ratio is 1.82.
We turn to the loan controls in our sample. The average log of facility amount is 3.79.
The information of the retained share of lead arrangers is available for a small proportion of around 5700 facilities only. On average, a lead arranger retains a share of 56 percent of the facility. On the other hand, the absolute amount of the lead arrangers stake is 2.64 when we look at the log of facility amount. Syndicated loans in our sample have an average maturity of 43 months. In addition, on average each syndicate has 6 lenders and is structured into 1.77
facilities. Looking at the loan types, 73 percent of loans are lines of credit while 24 percent are term loans. Almost all loans are senior in the borrowers liability structure. In the end, 75 percent of loans are secured by collateral.
We check the sample characteristics of banks. Banks are much larger as the average log of bank total assets is 18.15. The average equity to asset ratio is 7.56 percent. The average share of nonperforming loans to gross loans is less than 1 percent. The mean of bank Z score is 3.17. The average ROA is also below 1 percent. Liquid assets account for 18.77 percent of total assets. The average loan growth rate is rather high at 22 percent. The average bank has the cost of funds at 3.42 percent. As not all banks are listed and traded in stock exchanges, we have the information of interbank correlation for approximately 9200 facilities. The average interbank correlation is 0.73. Table 2 reports the baseline results of how U.S. banks price idiosyncratic and systematic risks of borrowers. We estimate all specifications with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. We present the results using idiosyncratic volatility and systematic volatility estimated from the CAPM regression in column 1. The coefficient of the idiosyncratic volatility is positive and significant, indicating banks charge risk premium for bearing idiosyncratic default of the borrower. On the contrary, the coefficient of systematic risk is negative and significant, suggesting that banks love for correlation and underprice systematic risk. Overall, we find systematic risk is underpriced relative to idiosyncratic risk, consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 1, suggesting bank systemic risk taking. We have similar results in column 2 in which we use idiosyncratic and systematic volatility estimated from the Fama French three factor model 10 . In column 3, we include total volatility as the measure of credit risk and systematic volatility as the measure of correlation as key variables of interest. We find a positive and significant coefficient for total volatility which directly suggests banks dislike credit risk and therefore charge risk premiums. Again, we find negative and significant coefficient for systematic risk, indicating that banks prefer correlated firms and underprice systematic risk.
Results
How are idiosyncratic and systematic risks priced?
In addition, the firm characteristics have expected signs and are mostly significant. In particular, we find that larger firms, firms with higher profit margins, higher net working capital and tangible assets and higher market to book ratio pay lower loan spreads, whereas higher leveraged firms are charged higher lending rates. Besides, regarding to the loan specific variables, we find that larger loans with longer maturity, more lenders in the syndicate are related to lower spreads, while loans with more facilities are charged at a higher rate.
Moreover, lines of credit are generally cheaper. A loan is much cheaper if it is senior as it ensures the priority of lender to claim to the residual value in the event of borrower bankruptcy. Furthermore, a secured loan is charged a higher spread than a similar one without collateral probably because only risky borrowers are required for collateral and are ex ante charged a risk premium. Last, we find that larger banks, well-capitalized banks, banks with high cost of funding and high loan growth rates charge lower spreads while risky banks charge relatively higher spreads. To save space, we do not report the estimated coefficient of firm, loan and bank specific control variables in the following specifications.
Our baseline specification may be prone to omitted variable bias if unobserved firm characteristics drive both firms equity volatility and loan spreads. We restructure our data into panel data in which i=firm and f=facility. We estimate the firm fixed effect model, allowing for arbitrary correlation between the unobserved effect and the observed explanatory variables. The identification comes from the within firm changes in equity volatility and loan spreads. We report the results in the first two columns of Table 3 . The results further confirm our findings that idiosyncratic volatility is positively priced and systematic volatility is negatively priced. The weak significance of systematic volatility is the result of short dimension along facilities within the borrower as each firm borrows on average 2.7 facilities in our sample 11 . Likewise, to rule out the effect of unobserved bank characteristics on lending rates, we reorganize our sample into panel data in which b=bank and f=facility. We estimated a bank fixed effect model that eliminates the unobserved effect across lenders but constant over facilities. We present basically the same results in columns 3 and 4. We have very statistically significant results as each bank lends on average 30 facilities in our sample.
Taken together, the results we presented so far support Hypothesis 1 that banks underprice systematic risk relative to idiosyncratic risk in presence of the 'Too-many-to-fail' guarantee.
We interpret the pricing pattern as evidence of bank systemic risk taking in presence of safety net.
Do nonbank lenders take systemic risk?
Unlike banks which have explicit or implicit 'Too-many-to-fail' guarantee and therefore take systemic risk, nonbank lenders in principle are not protected by such guarantee and therefore should have no incentive to take systemic risk. In principle, Hypothesis 2 should hold for nonbank lenders. In this part, we apply the pricing model to the loans originated by nonbank investors 12 .
11 We fail to have significant results once we use firm-bank fixed effects as each firm-bank pair has only 1.8 facilities which indicates loss of massive information in regressions.
12 For descriptions of the role of nonbank lenders in the syndicated loan market, see Ivashina and Sun (2011) .
The loans originated by nonbank lenders are much fewer than the bank loans in the U.S. syndicated loan market. We collect 1788 loans granted by finance companies, corporations, mutual funds and etc. We compare the loan pricing patterns by nonbank lenders and bank lenders in Table 4 . As the accounting information for nonbank lenders is not as accessible as banks, we only control for borrower, loan specific variables and year dummies. We find systemic risk and idiosyncratic risks are priced similarly by nonbank lenders in columns 1 and 3. In particular, the estimated coefficient for systematic risk is slightly greater that the coefficient of idiosyncratic risk, in line with the prediction of the standard asset pricing theory in Hypothesis 2. For comparison, we report the regression for bank lenders in columns 2 and 4, in which our main results that systematic risk is underpriced relative to idiosyncratic risk still hold. Overall, the absence of the underpricing of systematic risk in the nonbank lender cohort suggests that the systemic risk taking of banks is driven by the 'Too-many-to-fail' guarantee.
Do firms get discount on systematic risk from less correlated banks?
To further investigate bank systemic risk taking, we estimate the pricing model incorporated bank correlation in equation (4). We report the results based on CAPM equity volatilities in column 1 in Table 5 . We find the idiosyncratic volatility is positively related to loan spreads, suggesting that banks charge a risk premium for bearing the firm-specific default risk. On the contrary, the coefficient of systematic risk is negative but insignificant. The interaction term between idiosyncratic volatility and low correlation dummy is positive and weakly significant. However, the interaction between systematic volatility and low correlation dummy is negative and significant, suggesting that less correlated banks charge lower lending rates on systematic risk relative to more correlated banks. Taken together, we find less correlated banks underprice systematic risk more relative to more correlated banks.
To relax the restrictions of identical coefficients of the firm, loan and bank specific covariates for correlated and less correlated banks in the baseline regression, we divide our sample into two corresponding subsamples. We report the results of sample split in the columns 2 and 3. We find that systematic risk is negatively and significantly priced by less correlated banks whereas insignificantly priced by more correlated banks. This indicates less correlated banks have stronger incentives to take systematic risk of borrowers and therefore increase systemic risk. We do the same exercise using Fama French equity volatilities and have similar results in columns 4 to 6. Overall, we find evidence that supports Hypothesis 3 that less correlated banks have stronger incentive to underprice systematic risk.
Do less correlated banks lend more to systematically risky borrowers?
Having shown that less correlated banks underprice systematic risk, we examine whether they take lend more to systematically risky borrowers. A large stake in the syndicated loans granted to systematically risky borrowers is another indicator of taking systemic risk. We report the results that less correlated banks take a large share of the loan and a large loan size when lending to a systematically risky borrower in Table 6 . We use the share of loan held by the bank (Share Exposure) as the dependent variable in the first two columns. We find banks generally hold a large share of the facility if the idiosyncratic risk of the borrower is high and systematic risk is low. However, less correlated banks take a large share when the borrower is systematically risky, in line with our prediction that less correlated banks have stronger incentives to invest in systematic risk and to increase asset correlation. In the last two columns we use the log of facility amount held by the bank (Dollar Exposure) as the dependent variable. We have similar results that less correlated banks take a large size of loans when the borrower is systematically risky. It is worth noting that the number of observations in the regression drops drastically since the information of loan share retained by the lead arranger is available for 47 % of our loan facilities. Overall, we conclude that less correlated banks not only charge a lower lending rate to the systematically risky borrowers, but also take larger systematically risky loans.
Bank size matters
The traditional 'Too-big-to-fail' theory argues big banks are likely to take risk to exploit the safety net, whereas Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) predict that small banks have stronger incentives to increase interbank correlation. Though bank size and interbank correlation are likely highly related, we directly test the hypothesis that small banks are likely to underprice systematic risk and take systemic risk. We create a dummy Small that equals one if the bank size is smaller than the median value and zero otherwise. Next, we interact Small with idiosyncratic and systematic risks. In Table 7 we present the results. In column 1, we find banks generally charge a higher spread for idiosyncratic risk. The coefficient for systematic risk and the interaction between idiosyncratic risk and Small are negative and insignificant.
However, the interaction term between systematic risk and Small is negative and significant, suggesting that small banks underprice systematic risk relative to big banks. In the end, the coefficient of Small is positive and significant, indicating that generally small banks charge higher lending rates. We split our full sample into loans originated by small banks and big banks and report the results in columns 2 and 3. The results further support Hypothesis 3.
The exercises based on Fama French equity volatilities in columns 4 to 6 yield similar results.
Taken together, we find small banks tend to underprice systematic risk. This is different from the prediction of 'Too-big-to-fail' theory, therefore we reject Hypothesis 4.
Conclusion
This paper documents evidence of bank systemic risk taking from loan pricing data. We find loan spreads are positively related to borrowers idiosyncratic risk but negatively related to systematic risk. The lending rate discount for systematic exposure reveals banks preference for increased correlation and systemic risk. We relate this collective moral hazard to the 'Too-many-to-fail guarantee in bank regulation. We show that no evidence of such systemic risk taking could be found in the loans originated by nonbank lenders in absence of bailout expectation. In line with the 'Too-many-to-fail theory in Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007), we find less correlated and small banks are more aggressive in systemic risk taking as they underprice systematic risk of the borrower more relative to more correlated and big banks.
This finding also suggests that our results are not driven by 'Too-big-to-fail guarantee.
Our results have direct policy implications for macro prudential regulations. First, the fact that banks take advantage of the financial safety net and pass through regulatory subsidies to borrowers in the form of inappropriate pricing of risk may threat the stability of the whole banking sector. Second, much attention has been paid to systemically important financial institutions (SIFI) which contribute substantially to systemic risk. However, in this paper we
show that small and less correlated banks need attention for regulation as well. The dependent variable is all-in-drawn spread. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the borrower level in the first two columns and at the bank level in the last two columns and reported in parentheses below coefficients. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
(1) Table 7 : Bank size matters
The dependent variable is all-in-drawn spread. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the borrower level and reported in parentheses below coefficients. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
(1) Idiosyncratic volatility using one factor CAPM regressions. Defined as the standard deviation of the residual.
CRSP
SysV ol
CAP M
Systematic volatility using one factor CAPM regressions.
Defined as the product of beta and market volatility.
CRSP
IdioV ol F F
Idiosyncratic volatility from Fama French three factor model.
Defined as the standard deviation of the residual.
CRSP and WRDS
SysV ol F F
Systematic volatility from Fama French three factor model. Defined as the total volatility that is attributable to Fama French factors and the factors crosscovariances.
CRSP and WRDS
Beta
CAP M
Equity beta estimated from the CAPM regression.
CRSP
Beta mkt F F
Market beta estimated from the Fama French three factor regression.
CRSP and WRDS
Beta smb F F
Size beta estimated from the Fama French three factor regression.
CRSP and WRDS
Beta hml F F
Value beta estimated from the Fama French three factor regression.
CRSP and WRDS
T otalV ol
Total equity volatility, defined as the standard deviation of daily excess return one year before the facility start date. Z Score BK Bank Z score, defined as sum of equity asset ratio and ROA divided by standard deviation of ROA. We use 8-quarter rolling window when calculating the standard deviation of ROA. We take log transformation as in Laeven and Levine (2009) .
CRSP
Call reports and FR-Y9C
ROA BK Return on assets.
Liquidity BK Liquid assets over total assets.
Loan Growth BK Growth rates of gross loans.
Cost of Funds BK Cost of funds, defined as total interest expenses over total liabilities.
InterbankCorr Interbank correlation, defined as the correlation between bank stock return and S&P 500 bank sector index.
CRSP and Datastream
LowCorrBK Dummy for less correlated banks of which interbank correlation is below median value.
